English
Bahasa IndonesiaIncreasing militarization for most Indonesians appears to be limited to West Papua and Poso. However, D-88 has already abused its mandate in Java in pursuit of alleged terrorists without having been properly held to account by Government Institutions (including the National Commission for Human Rights, Komnas HAM) or other civil society organisations that may fear the consequences of questioning the legality of its operations. Likewise, the military operates in plain sight in Java with a visible public role, pronouncing on political affairs and with former army officers assuming roles in Government and the civil service. In other words, security force operations against ‘terrorists’ in West Papua are not as distant as is assumed. But this also means that with coordinated effort, the public in Indonesia and beyond may yet have the potential to hold their power to account and end impunity.
Briefings
Bagi banyak orang Indonesia, militerisasi tampaknya hanya meningkat di West Papua dan Poso. Padahal, pelanggaran wewenang Densus 88 juga berlangsung di Jawa. Dengan memburu terduga teroris, misalnya, tanpa dimintai pertanggungjawaban oleh lembaga-lembaga pemerintah (termasuk Komnas HAM) atau organisasi masyarakat sipil lainnya, yang mungkin takut menghadapi konsekuensi tertentu jika mempertanyakan legalitas operasi-operasi Densus 88. Sama halnya, di Jawa anggota militer terang-terangan menjadi pejabat publik, membuat pernyataan politik, dan para purnawirawan mendapat posisi di pemerintahan dan urusan sipil. Dengan kata lain, operasi TNI-Polri melawan “teroris” di West Papua bukanlah hal yang baru. Namun ini berarti bahwa perlu upaya bersama oleh publik Indonesia dan luar negeri untuk menggugat tanggung jawab mereka dan menghentikan impunitas.
In this briefing we describe how Special Autonomy law has failed to achieve its objectives in two ways. First, despite promising to ‘protect’ West Papuan culture, and to economically empower indigenous West Papuans, many important aspects of the law have been only partly implemented or ignored altogether. Second, instead of implementing the law, the authorities have resorted to governing through a programme of development projects from abundant funds. While some see existing efforts as having failed because they are not based on principles of ‘inclusive’ development, alternatives of creating new provinces and districts, supposedly to ensure equitable participation, have often led to the enrichment and empowerment of the security forces in remote areas, leading to further conflict.
Otonomi khusus (Otsus) dan pendanaannya diharapkan dapat menghentikan marjinalisasi yang diderita oleh rakyat West Papua setelah periode pemerintahan darurat militer dan transmigrasi yang panjang pada masa Orde Baru. Kendati menghentikan marjinalisasi mensyaratkan adanya pemberdayaan Orang Asli West Papua melalui peningkatan kualitas demokrasi dan hak asasi manusia (HAM), lembaga-lembaga yang didirikan berdasarkan otonomi khusus dipandang tidak representatif dan tidak sah oleh Orang Asli West Papua.
Since the fall of the New Order regime (1966-1998), with one brief period of exception between 1998-2001, the power and authority of the Indonesian security forces in the region of West Papua have remained largely undiminished. We attribute this to two reasons, both of which stem from a failure to implement genuine political reform in West Papua and Indonesia more broadly.
Sejak rezim Orde Baru (1966-1998) tumbang, kecuali dalam satu periode singkat antara 1998-2001, kekuasaan dan otoritas pasukan keamanan Indonesia di wilayah West Papua secara umum tidak pernah berkurang. Menurut kami, hal itu terjadi karena dua alasan, dan kedua alasan itu berasal dari kegagalan menjalankan reformasi politik yang sejati di West Papua dan Indonesia.